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The current economic slowdown in the United States and the decline in remittance growth to some Latin 
American countries have intensified the interest in the relationship between these variables. We 
investigate whether host country conditions affect remittance outflows to Latin America, 
focusing on the roles of regional U.S. business cycles, geographical variation in immigrant 
density and sectoral factors.  Using quarterly data for 1995-2008, we find that remittance flows are 
strongly influenced by economic conditions in the specific regions of the U.S. where migrants are 
clustered, as well as in the sectors especially important for immigrants' employment opportunities. The 
results are in sharp contrast to previous research suggesting that remittance flows are relatively insensitive 
to fluctuations in the aggregate U.S. business cycle. Precise estimation of these linkages is also shown to 
matter for gauging the sensitivity of remittances to economic conditions in the home country, and hence 
the extent to which remittances might buffer domestic shocks as well as transmitting external ones.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Following the rapid growth of workers’ remittances over the last decades, they have become 
a very important source of external financing for many developing countries. In some Central 
American countries remittances now account for up to 25 percent of GDP and by far outpace 
e.g. FDI, other capital inflows and aid. Hence it is not surprising that policymakers and 
researchers have tried to understand the effects of remittances on the recipient economies. 
Remittances have been argued to possess several attractive features; as unrequited transfers, 
they create no future obligations, and compared to other types of financial inflows they have 
appeared more stable. But to properly investigate for example the destabilizing or insurance 
properties of remittance flows for the receiving countries, or to forecast them, we first need 
to understand their drivers. This subject has received much less attention so far, and produced 
very few conclusions.  
 
Figure 1 Remittances to Central America and Mexico 
 
X-axis: Billions of U.S. dollars, seasonally adjusted. Sources: Haver Analytics, national authorities, and IMF 
International Financial Statistics.   
 
Remittances are usually defined as the portion of migrant workers’ earnings sent back to the 
country of origin. From this it is natural to think that the size of current earnings, or the labor 
market prospects of immigrants in the host country, could matter for the size of transfers. 
Indeed recently it often has been suspected that the current economic slowdown in the U.S. is 
behind the drop or deceleration in remittances to Mexico and a lesser extent El Salvador. It 
has however been hard to establish linkages between U.S. economic factors and remittances 
to Latin America at business cycle frequencies (Roache & Gradzka 2007).  
 
Our contribution is to demonstrate econometrically that U.S. economic conditions indeed 
matter for remittances to Latin America, but that the aggregate business cycle previously 
studied is not very relevant. Focusing on the U.S. aggregate economy can be seriously 
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instead concentrated in a limited number of states, and (ii) as we demonstrate, regional and 
state-level business cycles within the U.S. are quite heterogeneous (indeed as different as 
between EMU countries).  
 
These two key stylized facts help us identify linkages between U.S. state-level and regional 
economic variables and remittances to Latin America, both through looking at correlation 
coefficients between cyclical components of series and polynomial lag estimation. We find 
that remittance flows to LA countries are strongly influenced by economic conditions in the 
specific regions of the U.S. where migrants are clustered, as well as the sectors especially 
important for immigrants' employment opportunities. We also find evidence of remittances 
responding positively to negative macroeconomic conditions at home. Hence remittances can 
potentially both absorb domestic shocks and transmit external ones. To our knowledge, this 
paper is the first to study the importance of disaggregate U.S. indicators in this context, and 
our results are in sharp contrast to the failure to detect strong effects of U.S. variables in 
previous literature.  
 
By establishing linkages at business cycle frequencies we are able to provide some simple 
“rules of thumb” for forecasting the effects of U.S. economic conditions on remittances to 
Latin America. But second, and maybe more important, the empirical findings here also 
suggest that we should not only think about whether remittances can smooth income declines 
in the remitters’ country of origin but also that shocks in immigrants’ host countries could be 
transmitted via remittances. As we show in our theoretical companion paper (Magnusson, 
2008), featuring a two-country general equilibrium model, host country shocks to remittances 
have substantial implications for the volatility of key macroeconomic variables in the 
recipient economies. Even if remittances are (weakly) countercyclical to home country GDP, 
remittances cannot substantially smoothen the home business cycle if aggregate shocks to 
home and host country output are positively correlated, as is the case for e.g. Mexico, El 
Salvador and the U.S.  
 
While remittances are sent by most Hispanic subgroups in the U.S., this paper concentrates 
on those from the Mexican and Salvadoran populations. In absolute terms, Mexico is one of 
the globally largest recipients of remittances, currently receiving some 25 billion U.S. dollars 
annually. As a percentage of GDP, remittances however stand at about 3% of GDP in 
Mexico compared to almost 20% in El Salvador, the second largest recipient of remittances 
in the hemisphere. Not only are remittances important for these economies, but reliable 
information on where their remitters work and sufficiently long time series of the data needed 
are also available. While sharing the U.S. as the most important destination for migrants, 
Mexico and El Salvador also have some interesting differences in emigrants’ location and 
occupation that will be found important for their ability to diversify the effects of U.S. 
regional shocks on remittance receipts.  
 
Section II of this paper reviews two distinct strands of earlier literature related to our 
analysis: the first studying the importance of cyclical economic conditions for remittances 
and the second concerning U.S. state and regional business cycles. Section III describes the 
data used and discusses measurement issues. Section IV documents the geographic 
concentration of Hispanic immigrants and state-level business cycle heterogeneity in the U.S.   4 
Section V presents our econometric procedures and results. Section VI concludes and draws 
policy implications. 
 
II.   LITERATURE 
Most of the remittances literature falls into three broad areas: (i) the microeconomic motives 
for remitting and the sociodemographic profile of remitters and recipients, (ii) institutional 
features of the remittance market such as the effects of declining transaction costs, and (iii) 
the effects of remittances on the recipient economies and the importance of conditions in the 
same countries such as natural disasters, wars, political and macroeconomic factors for the 
decision to remit. As earlier mentioned, less attention has been paid to the role of “host 
country” conditions. 
 
The results from the literature on the importance of home country conditions are mixed, 
finding both negative and positive effects on remittances.. This has been justified by 
remittances having two possible functions: compensatory transfers seeking to alleviate 
recipients’ economic distress or opportunitistic flows allowing remitters to take advantage of 
favorable investment opportunities in the home country, thus resulting in either a negative or 
positive coefficient on home country conditions. The view of remittances as compensatory 
transfers currently seems to have the most support (Chami et al, 2008, Sayan, 2006). Part of 
the differences in results may also be due to studies failing to take into account the 
importance of host country factors. 
 
In the most thorough examination to date of host country conditions in the Western 
Hemisphere, Roache and Gradzka (2007) conclude after using a range of methods that no 
clear linkages between remittances and U.S. macroeconomic factors can be established. On 
the other hand, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) look at flows from the U.S. to several 
countries including Mexico and find evidence of linkages using a vector error-correction 
model. A range of aggregate U.S. indicators are found to Granger-cause remittances to 
Mexico, although imprecise estimation makes the results somewhat difficult to interpret.   
 
For other regions of the world and with methodologies differing from ours, a few studies 
have also found positive host country effects. Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) use a gravity 
model and per capita income growth as a measure of the host country business stance, and 
find positive effects on bilateral remittances to the Middle East, Europe and Asia. Positive 
host country effects have also been found for remittances to Greece and Egypt (Lianos 1997, 
El-Sakka and McNabb 1999). Studies on the Germany-Turkey remittance corridor from a 
business cycle perspective have yielded mixed results. Sayan (2004) find no statistically 
significant linkages while Aydas, Metin-Ozcan and Neyapti (2005) do. Host country 
conditions have also be used as (valid) instruments for remittances in several studies 
(Aggarwal and Martinez Peria, 2006, Bugamelli and Paternò, 2008). 
 
Studies on regional business cycles in the U.S. date back to the early works of McLaughlin 
(1930), Vining (1949), Borts (1960) and Syron (1978). There has recently been a renewed 
interest in the topic following the finding that business cycles across countries have become 
more synchronized with increased international economic and financial integration over the 
last decades. However, and importantly for our analysis, the U.S. is displaying more   5 
heterogeneity in regional and local business cycles since the 1990s compared to earlier 
decades. In fact, the results in Artis and Zhang (1999) imply that most EMU economies 
became more synchronized with Germany during the ERM period than U.S. state economies 
were with each other by the late 1980s and onwards.  
 
The sources of business cycle heterogeneity within the U.S. still seem to be an open question, 
but most authors favor differences in industry mix as an explanation. Regional and spatial 
effects (e.g. neighbors’ industry mix) seem to be weaker, but most studies find the Midwest 
to be the region most synchronized with the aggregate U.S. cycle (Owyang, Rapach and 
Wall, 2007, Partridge and Rickman, 2005). Of special interest to our project, Cañas and 
Phillips (2008) have noted that the region bordering Mexico in the southwest has become 
significantly more aligned with the Mexican cycle since the introduction of NAFTA in 1994, 
but that the effects within this U.S. region again differ depending on industry mix. 
 
III.   DATA  
A major complicating factor in our analysis is that high-frequency remittance data 
disaggregated by origin in the U.S. is currently not available. There is some state-by-state-
evidence on remittances to Latin America from three annual surveys conducted by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB henceforth). The nature of the information unfortunately 
makes it unsuitable for time-series analysis as these surveys cover different states in different 
years. It is however noteworthy that the states highlighted by the IDB surveys as major 
origins of remittances are well aligned with the “Hispanic” states that we will identify in the 
next section. We will instead use data from national central banks on total remittance 
inflows, measured at the quarterly frequency and starting in 1995 for Mexico and 1998 for El 
Salvador. We will deal with this aggregate nature of remittances data in various ways in our 
estimations. Since about 95% of remittances to these countries reportedly come from the U.S. 
we are rather confident about not picking up large effects of other host countries.  
 
There is an ongoing discussion about whether the available remittance data accurately 
captures the actual amounts transferred, and how variation in caption over time has affected 
data. While earlier remittance data from the region mainly included transfers made through 
official channels, efforts have been made during the latest decade also to include informal 
remittances e.g. though surveys of returning migrants at the border. This improved capture 
clearly has contributed to the high growth rates of remittances, but the extent of this effect is 
not well known. 
 
There are some indications supporting the accuracy of Mexican data. Remittance inflows to a 
certain area within Mexico are positively correlated with the number of emigrants from the 
same region, suggesting that remittance patterns can be reconciled with demographic factors. 
The credibility of high-frequency movements in remittances is supported by data showing 
seasonal spikes coinciding with important events in the recipient countries such as religious 
holidays, Mother’s Day and the start of the school year (Cañas, Coronado and Orrenius, 
2007, IMF, 2006, INEGI, 2008).  
 
Concerning U.S. variables, it is customary to date state recessions from developments in 
payroll employment. We follow this literature and make use of state-level employment data   6 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment statistics. This survey covers about 
400,000 work sites each month. Alternatives could have been state-level output or personal 
income. Estimates of U.S. output at the state level are available but are subject to a higher 
degree of uncertainty than at the national level. Personal income on the other hand also 
includes regional transfers and capital income payments, which makes it less appropriate for 
business cycle analysis. In addition, state-level price indices required to obtain real income or 
output are not available (Owyang, Rapach and Wall, 2007, Orrenius, Saving and Caputo, 
2005, Partridge and Rickman, 2005, Phillips and Cañas, 2007). Lastly, and most relevant for 
our topic, we suspect that remitters’ income in the U.S. derives far more from their labor than 
from profit on capital, so a focus on labor market conditions seems appropriate. 
 
We also study two sub-components of total employment per state: employment in the 
construction and leisure services sectors. The construction sector is often claimed to be of 
special importance for Mexican immigrants’ employment opportunities, although it makes up 
only 5% of U.S. total employment.  The same goes for the service sector and Salvadoran 
immigrants. While we ideally would have liked to include all service employment this was 
not available for all states. We however have reasons to believe that our results can be 
generalized to the broader service sector as employment in the leisure service sector was 
highly correlated with total service sector employment for the states where both measures 
were available. Agriculture is also a very important sector, especially for Mexican short-term 
migrants, but sufficiently long time series of agricultural employment at the state level were 
unfortunately not available.  
 
Remittance data and recipient country GDP were adjusted for seasonal effects using the U.S. 
Census Bureau X12 program. Data was deflated using U.S. CPI for remittances and the 
corresponding GDP deflator for recipient country output series. For most methods employed 
in this paper the data need to be stationary. This was not the case for any log-level series 
according to the common Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Peron tests, which failed to 
reject non-stationarity. 
 
Data on the number and state-level location of Hispanic immigrants were taken from the U.S. 
Censuses for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Up to half of the immigrants are however 
thought unauthorized and the extent to which their activities are captured by official statistics 
remains an open question (Orrenius, 2008, Chiswick and Hurst 2000, Miller and Neo, 2003). 
To compare Hispanic immigrants’ residency with that for illegal immigrants we used data on 
the location of issuance of Mexican matricula consular identity cards during 2004-2007. 
These identity cards are used for identification by many illegal Mexicans and can be obtained 
by the applicant only from the geographically closest of the 47 Mexican consulates in the 
U.S. As shown in tables 4 and 6 in the appendix, the percentage of issuance of identity cards 
in a certain state is well aligned with the census data on the Hispanic fraction of population
2. 
Hence, we feel rather confident about using the official statistics (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Mexico, 2008).  
                                                 
2 Given the Mexicans’ dominant share of the Hispanic population, data on people of Hispanic origin is likely to 
be a good proxy for the Mexican population.    7 
 
IV.   HISPANICS’ LOCATION AND STATE-LEVEL CYCLE HETEROGENEITY IN THE U.S. 
The first stylized fact we establish is the striking geographical bias in the distribution of 
Hispanics across states. Almost 35% of individuals of Hispanic origin resided in California in 
2005, as shown in table 4 in the appendix. The four border states Arizona, California, New 
Mexico and Texas were home to almost 60% according to U.S. Census data. In contrast, the 
40 least “Hispanic” of the 51 U.S. states only hosted 15% of the population group. Only 
looking at number of Hispanic individuals also masks some important trends, where 
traditional “Hispanic” states such as Texas and New York have seen much smaller, and 
according to some sources negative Hispanic population gains, and instead e.g. Colorado and 
Georgia that traditionally have had low number of Hispanic immigrants have seen their share 
rise considerably. Most of geographic transitions by Hispanics however seem to be within 
states (U.S. Census Bureau 1995, 2000, 2005).  
 
The U.S. census data does not contain state-level information about different sub-
nationalities within the Hispanic category. As two-thirds of the Hispanic population in the 
U.S. is of Mexican origin, the census data may give a reasonably good approximation of 
Mexicans’ distribution across states. For Salvadorans, surveys have found that the majority 
resides in a dozen states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Texas and Virginia, but the distribution across these 
states is unknown. As earlier mentioned, both Mexican and Salvadoran immigrants tend to 
work mainly in the construction and services sector, with the former being relatively more 
important for Mexicans and the latter for Salvadorans (Gammage, 2007, Garcia and Palacios, 
2008). 
 
We now turn to state the second of our stylized facts, demonstrating business cycle 
heterogeneity among U.S. states and regions, as measured by correlation coefficients 
between the cyclical components of HP-filtered data. Figure 2 below illustrates the point with 
correlations of California—which is the economically largest of the U.S. states, as well as the 
most “Hispanic”—with each of the other states, and with the aggregate U.S. employment 
cycle. (Note that California is in a sense more Hispanic than it is economically dominant, 
with 35% of the U.S. Hispanic population compared to 10% of total employment.)   
   8 
Figure 2 Distribution of correlations between the employment cycle in California and 
the rest of the U.S  
 
   
 
X-axis: Comovement between California, other U.S. states and total U.S. employment, ordered by magnitude. 
Y-axis: Size of correlation coefficient. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey. 
Note: Correlations are contemporaneous and between cyclical components of HP-filtered and logged data.  
 
It is clear that very considerable business cycle heterogeneity exists. For more than half of 
the U.S. states, the correlations are less than 0.3, and some of those are negative. On the other 
hand, 17 states show correlations of + 0.6 or more. Among these are some states 
geographically close to California such as Colorado but also other further away. Reflecting 
this diversity, California’s correlation with the aggregate U.S., marked in red, is in between, 
about + 0.5. The correlations between service employment in California, the other states and 
the aggregate U.S. look very similar, while the construction sector shows less heterogeneity 
in cycles across states. The magnitude and patterns of correlation coefficients are broadly in 
line with estimates in previous literature (Partridge and Rickman, 2005).  
 
Regarding the importance of different industry mix across states, we can only infer 
differences in relative weights of the services and construction sectors from our data. We find 
that the construction sector has a larger share of employment in most of the “Hispanic” states 
outlined above, the exceptions being Illinois and New York. The same is true but to a lesser 
extent of our service sector measure. There is also as much variation in correlations between 
the three different employment measures within a certain state as for the same sector between 
states discussed in the previous paragraph. We find no evidence of Hispanic states having 
especially strong or weak within-state correlations of the three employment variables 
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V.   ESTIMATING LINKAGES 
Our main hypothesis is that remittances to Mexico and El Salvador should be more positively 
affected by U.S. economic conditions in regions and sectors where the majority of remitters 
work. To test this, we first look at correlation coefficients and then proceed to a multivariate 
analysis, controlling for other variables, using distributed lag models.  
 
A.   Correlation coefficients 
To assess the links between remittances and U.S. regional indicators, we calculated 
correlation coefficients between remittances and the three employment measures for the U.S. 
48 contiguous states.
3 We also present correlation coefficients for the aggregate of all state-
level variables to put these state-level results in perspective. To make data stationary two 
separate methods were used, HP-filtering and first-differences. Qualitatively the same pattern 
was obtained with the two techniques but with first-differenced data correlations were in 
general lower as were t-statistics.
4 We will only present results obtained from HP-filtered 
data for space reasons. To account for time effects, we calculated contemporaneous 
correlation coefficients as well as correlations with 1 to 4 quarter lags of the U.S. indicators. 
Results were quite similar for one and two quarter lags while correlations decreased for 
further lags. For clarity of the presentation, Figure 3 on the next page shows results only for 
states where correlation coefficients were high and significant.
5 
 
From Figure 3, a number of interesting observations can be made. First, the states where high 
and significant correlations are found match well with the “Mexican” or “Salvadoran” states 
outlined in the previous section. Of the states with significant Mexican and Salvadoran 
populations, Illinois is the only one where no employment indicator is significantly related to 
remittances to either country. One possible explanation for this is the relative geographic 
isolation and different regional business cycle of Illinois from e.g. California and the other 
“Hispanic” states shown earlier. 
 
The pattern of correlation coefficients also seems to pick up some of the differences in 
geographic location and sectoral occupation between Mexicans and Salvadorans discussed 
earlier. For remittances to Mexico, results are especially strong for the states along the 
southwestern border, while Salvadoran remittances seem related to a larger number of states. 
In fact, given the large number of states with significant coefficients for remittances to El 
                                                 
3 According to the literature on state-level business cycles in the U.S., Alaska and Hawaii display very different 
characteristics from the 48 contiguous states, and are therefore usually not investigated. We follow this 
convention. The District of Columbia was not included due to lack of data. 
4 This is in line with the different features of the HP-filter and first differences where the former keep more 
high-frequency variation which results in higher correlations (Baxter and King, 1999). 
5 For Mexico, very few coefficients were significant for other states. For El Salvador, coefficients were 
significant for some more states, but their magnitude was smaller than the ones shown in table 7 in the 
appendix.    10 
Salvador, one would almost expect remittances to that country also to be responsive to 
aggregate U.S. indicators, a point that is discussed further below.  
 
Figure 3 Significant cyclical correlations between remittances and U.S. variables, and 
geographic location of Mexican and Salvadoran immigrants 
 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Haver Analytics, author’s calculations. Note: “Sign. Result” refers to a 
correlation coefficient between cyclical components of HP-filtered variables significant at the 5% or higher 
level. Circles refer to populations of Mexicans and Salvadorans. Their sizes are proportional to shares of 
population for Mexico, not for Salvadorans as the corresponding information is not available. 
 
 
Correlations between remittances to El Salvador and various U.S. indicators were in general 
higher than the corresponding ones for Mexico, as shown in table 7 in the Appendix. 
Mexicans’ often claimed higher dependence on the construction sector also seems reflected 
in the higher number of significant coefficients compared to services employment.  
 
For comparison, we also calculated correlations with aggregate U.S. total employment, 
service and construction employment as well as with GDP of the recipient countries. As seen 
from table 8 in the appendix, remittances to Mexico only show a significant correlation with 
U.S. aggregate employment in construction, and the coefficient is considerably lower than 
most found for individual states. Remittances to El Salvador on the other hand seem to be   11 
responsive at high significance levels also to aggregate U.S variables, although again the 
coefficients are lower than for disaggregate U.S. data.  
 
Home country GDP was significantly and negatively correlated with remittances, consistent 
with the “remittances as compensatory transfers” hypothesis discussed in the literature 
review. Coefficients were remarkably similar in magnitude for Mexico and El Salvador and 
significant at the 10% level. The home country GDP coefficients are considerably lower than 
the ones we obtain for the U.S. indicators.   
 
To sum up the results from this section, correlations between remittances and U.S. variables 
are especially strong for the “Mexican” and “Salvadoran” states, suggesting our proposed 
research strategy might be fruitful. Moreover, and as to be expected given the earlier 
discussed state-level business cycle heterogeneity in the U.S., the pattern found in correlation 
coefficients at the aggregate level does not hold up at the state level.  
 
Notice however that these are simple unconditional correlation coefficients not controlling 
for other variables possibly affecting remittances. This includes possible bias from spillovers 
between U.S. variables. There is a risk of “over-fitting” total remittances to individual U.S. 
state-level variables in the sense that e.g. the coefficient on employment in Arizona is not 
picking up the effects on remittances from that particular state but in fact e.g. spillovers from 
California. A different, but related problem is that we can only hope to account for a fraction 
of the variation in remittances with any single state-level variable, given that total remittance 
flows emanate from many different locations in the U.S. We will address these issues in the 
next section. 
 
B.   Multivariate distributed lag models 
To assess whether the above preliminary evidence holds up in a more formal econometric 
framework, we proceed to distributed lag estimation. The hypothesis to be investigated is 
whether remittances are affected by contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous U.S. 
variables.  
 












γ β α               (1) 
 
where  it r  is the quarterly percentage change in remittance flows to country i in period t,  i α is 
a constant,  s β is a sensitivity parameter to be estimated, and  s t x −  is a stationary state-level 
U.S. employment variable in period t-s.  s t z −  denotes a set of control variables. In many cases, 
the high collinearity of current and lagged values of the x’s and z’s defeats direct estimation. 
The number of parameters to be estimated is instead reduced by using polynomial distributed 
lags which imposes a smoothness condition on the lag coefficients. Smoothness is expressed 
as requiring that the coefficients lie on a polynomial of relatively low degree. A polynomial 
distributed lag model with order p restricts the β  coefficients to lie on a  p -order polynomial 
of the form:   12 
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This specification allows us to estimate a model with P lags using only q parameters. 
 
Regarding the choice of control variables, there is as earlier mentioned an ongoing discussion 
about to what extent remittances respond to macroeconomic conditions in the home 
countries, and whether remittances can act as a stabilizing factor of their business cycles. 
Including GDP in the recipient countries as an explanatory variable is therefore important to 
assess and control for the effect of e.g. a shock to recipients’ income. There are also other, 
pure econometric, reasons to include home country GDP. If business cycle or economic 
growth indicators are highly correlated across countries, omission of origin country 
regressors would be a serious specification error. High correlations indeed seem to be the 
case both for aggregate and state-level variables in the case of Mexico, Central America and 
the U.S. (Phillips and Cañas, 2007, Roache, 2008, Sosa, 2008).  
 
Moreover, the Mexican (real) peso/dollar exchange rate could be an important factor to take 
into account for the decision of sending remittances in currency or kind. The sign of the 
exchange rate coefficient is a priori not clear. If families target a certain consumption level in 
domestic currency, a depreciation would result in a negative sign through falling remittances. 
But if the consumption basket also contains a considerable share of imported goods, a 
depreciated peso would be associated with an increase in remittances so as to preserve 
recipients’ purchasing power. El Salvador has been dollarized though most of the period 
under study why the exchange rate was not included in the regressions for that country.  
 
Lacking a theoretical model of how long it should take for a shock to the exogenous variables 
to affect remittance outflows, we rely upon measures of fit. After estimating equations with 
various lag and polynomial orders, we report below the ones with the lowest Akaike 
information criteria. In most specifications, this was achieved for 4-6 quarter lags of the 
explanatory variables, with polynomials of degree two to three. In polynomial lag estimation, 
the sum of the coefficients on the explanatory variable can be interpreted as the elasticity of 
the dependent variable to an innovation in the former over the estimation period. The 
coefficients should be interpreted as an upper bound on estimated effects as they measure 
accumulated effects over time assuming immigrants do not change geographical residence or 
sectoral occupation, arguably a strict assumption.  
 
We estimated two sets of regressions: first on state-by-state and second on regional and re-
weighted variables, to address the problems with state-level analysis outlined earlier. 
Regarding the first problem of “over-fitting” remittances to individual state-level variables 
and to tackle that results from state-level indicators are not instead picking up an aggregate   13 
U.S. factor, we estimate regressions with and without the aggregate U.S. total employment, 
employment in services and construction respectively. This way, we make sure that in the 
state-by-state regressions we only pick up the effect of a certain state over and above the 
impact of the aggregate U.S. cycle. The results from state-level regressions, reported in tables 
9 and 10 in the appendix, confirmed the evidence obtained from looking at correlation 
coefficients. For Mexico, remittances were again significantly affected by especially 
construction sector employment in the “Mexican” states and the Southwestern border states 
outlined before. Salvadoran remittances were again sensitive to a large number of states or a 
broad U.S. cycle compared to Mexico’s remittance inflows.  
 
Which aggregate U.S. cycle matters for total remittances? 
The second problem with state-level analysis outlined earlier is that any individual state can 
explain at best a fraction of total remittances. At the same time, discarding information from 
other states (beyond the U.S. aggregate control variable) that may have largely orthogonal 
business cycles reduces our ability to explain total remittances. What we would like is 
instead to get a picture of the economic conditions facing the larger majority of Mexican and 
El Salvadoran immigrants in the U.S. In this way, we can hope to capture more of the 
variation in total flows of remittances. This also makes the magnitude of the effects we find 
more comparable with previous studies using aggregate data.  
 
To this end, we aggregate the state-level data in such as fashion that we give higher weights 
to the states that matter most for immigrant employment opportunities. We do so in two 
ways: first, by constructing weighted aggregate “Mexican” and “Salvadoran” variables for 
total employment, employment in the services and construction sector, and second by 
looking at the Southwestern border states separately. At least 60% of Mexican immigrants 
are thought to reside in the four border states; for Salvadoran immigrants we have no reason 
to believe this region to be of special importance. 
 
We begin by stating the results for aggregate U.S. variables for comparison. In the below 
regressions, the control variables were the respective home country’s GDP, and in the case of 
Mexico also the real peso/dollar exchange rate.  
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Table 1  Distributed Lag Estimation, remittances and aggregate U.S. variables 
Mexico               
  US variable  MX GDP  Exchange rate  R-sq   
US total 
employment  2.80 (0.79)  1.61 (0.86) 
 
2.21 (1.19)  0.35    
US 
construction  6.06 (1.12)  4.33 (0.54) 
 
1.06 (0.34)  0.36   
US services  -1.12(-0.14)  0.75 (0.76)  1.20 (0.45)  0.28    
           
El Salvador           
           
  US variable  SLV GDP     R-sq    
US total 
employment  1.13*(1.54)  -3.03 (-1.18) 
 
0.49   
US 
construction  4.10  (1.27)  -5.03** (-1.72) 
 
0.48   
US services  6.89** (1.77)  -4.61** (-1.97)    0.35   
Source: Author’s calculations. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level respectively. T-
statistics in parenthesis.  
 
The above table confirms the results from simple correlation coefficients; remittances to 
Mexico are not significantly affected neither by total U.S. employment, nor U.S. employment 
in the construction and services sectors. Neither do remittances to Mexico seem to be 
affected by domestic developments. Remittances to El Salvador, on the other hand, show 
sensitivity both to aggregate U.S. employment and employment in the services sector. 
Coefficients on Salvadoran GDP were negative and significant in two out of three 
regressions, and of about the same magnitude as the coefficients on the U.S. variables. This 
suggests a bad income shock in El Salvador could affect remittances positively even after 
controlling for host country factors.  
 
We keep these results, or lack thereof in the Mexican case, in mind when continuing to 
estimations for remittances to Mexico, El Salvador and weighted U.S. variables. For the 
“Mexican” variables we aggregate the state-level variables using as weights the percentage of 
Hispanics living in each state using the U.S. 2000 Census.
6 Given the dominant share of 
Mexicans in the Hispanic population, the Hispanic shares of population are good proxies for 
where Mexicans reside. For the “Salvadoran” variables we simply add up states where there 
is evidence of significant populations residing, and control for the aggregate U.S. variables.
7  
 
                                                 
6 We also tried using the 1995 and 2005 weights as well as an average and results did not change. 
7 These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Texas and Virginia.   15 
Table 2 Distributed Lag Estimation, remittances and  U.S. "Mexican" and 
"Salvadoran" variables 
 
Mexico                
 
U.S. 





















(1.60)    0.58 
US "Mexican"  
services 





(1.22)    0.33 
         
El Salvador         
 
U.S. 














(-1.34)    0.60 





(-1.50)    0.48 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level respectively. T-
statistics in parenthesis. 
 
The striking differences in the above table compared to the results for the un-weighted 
aggregate variables in Table 1 concern Mexico. Remittances to Mexico show strongly 
significant relationships with our constructed “Mexican” variables for both total employment 
and employment in the construction sector as opposed to the lack of results for un-weighted 
variables. This again lends support to the idea that certain states are of major importance for 
Mexican immigrant employment opportunities and hence also ability to remit.  
 
Interpreting the estimated coefficients as elasticities suggests that as a “rule of thumb,” 
remittances to Mexico can be expected to fall by about 2% over six quarters following a 1% 
initial decline in the U.S. “Hispanic” employment situation, or by 11% following a similar 
decline in the “Hispanic” construction sector. While not exactly comparable due to 
differences in methodology, the magnitude of the 2% coefficient is similar and the 11% 
somewhat larger than those found in Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) for other parts of the 
world. Interestingly enough, when we try to estimate the effects on the aggregate U.S. 
economy especially relevant for Mexicans we also find stronger effects for the Mexican 
control variables. This suggests that remittances might increase either in response to a 
positive shock in the host country or a negative one in remitters’ country of origin. 
 
For El Salvador, results are also stronger in terms of significance levels for the constructed 
“Salvadoran” variables compared to the un-weighted ones. Coefficients are however 
remarkably similar for the un-weighted and weighted variables, again confirming the more 
general sensitivity of Salvadoran remittances to U.S. variables both at the aggregate and state   16 
level, as well as the larger importance of the service sector. As a “rule of thumb”, a 1% fall in 
“Salvadoran” employment would lead to almost a 2% decline in remittances, or a 1% fall in 
services employment to an almost ten-fold effect. This is again in the ballpark of the 
estimated effects in Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006). Again, the Salvadoran control variables 
are also significant, with a negative sign, suggesting remittances’ dual response to conditions 
in both countries. 
 
Border States 
A possibility most relevant for Mexico is that the four states on the U.S. southwest border are 
especially important for remittances. Recall that about 60 percent of Hispanics in the U.S. 
reside in those states, and about 65 percent of the identity cards issued by Mexican consulates 
are issued there. Moreover, the region has a long history of circular migration and the 
transaction costs of remitting are possibly lower due to the smaller geographical distances 
between home and host countries. To investigate this hypothesis, we aggregate respectively 
state-level total employment, employment in the services and construction sectors for the 
border states California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. 
 
Again, we control for the U.S. aggregate respective employment variable, home country 
GDP and in Mexico’s case the exchange rate. Here, we view El Salvador as something of a 
control case. If we obtain equally strong results  for “border” variables for El Salvador and 
Mexico, we are probably not picking up the effects of distance to the border per se as these 
ought to be weaker for El Salvador than Mexico (since the former do not share a border with 
the U.S). Luckily for our hypothesis, results were not significant for any “border” variable 
for El Salvador after controlling for the aggregate U.S. variables. Hence, we only report 
results for Mexico in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3 Distributed Lag Estimation - U.S. "border" variables and Mexican remittances 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level respectively. 
 
The above table indicates that the border states indeed seem to play an especially important 
role for remittances to Mexico for all three different employment measures, and even more 
so than the “Mexican” employment variables investigated before. Coefficients are high and 
significant and R-squares are considerable. However, while the Mexican GDP control 
variables still had the expected signs in most cases, they were no longer statistically 
significant. This is probably due to the very high correlation of the U.S. border state variables 
with the Mexican GDP variable. It is possible that what we are picking up is not only the 
              
 
U.S. 












(0.43)    0.72 







(0.78)    0.77 







(0.05)    0.62   17 
effect of the economic conditions in the border states but also other factors such as increased 
immigration control which is possibly correlated with economic variables (see below).  
 
Robustness checks 
We conducted a number of tests to assess the plausibility of our results. First, we estimated 
all regressions using only the sample up to 2006:1, so as to control for the possible effects of 
the commonly perceived tightened security along the U.S.-Mexico border during the last two 
years. Early 2006 was also the period when growth in remittances to Mexico began to 
decline—and when the series for U.S. “housing construction starts” began to turn downward. 
Using this shorter sample only affected the results for the constructed “Mexican” and border 
state construction sector employment variables, where coefficients were smaller (but still 
significant) for the shorter sample period. This provides some indirect evidence that U.S. 
border security developments and the construction sector have played a role for the recent 
developments in remittances to Mexico.  
 
Second, we estimated an AR (1) specification, that is included a lagged term for the change 
in remittances among the explanatory variables. This did not change the results. As regards 
endogeneity concerns, it is possible that remittances may affect growth and exchange rates in 
the recipient countries. (This is perhaps more a concern for the analysis of El Salvador, 
where remittance inflows are much larger in relation to the domestic economy than in 
Mexico.) We believe our estimation method with its included lags should help diminish the 
contemporaneous effects on these variables, and hence the bias their interaction might 
produce.  
 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
While it seems plausible that workers’ remittances could depend positively on economic 
conditions in the host country, such linkages to the U.S. economy have been hard to establish 
formally for recipient countries in the Western Hemisphere. Our starting point in this paper 
was that this may partly be due to earlier studies concentrating on the stance of the overall 
U.S. economy. After documenting significant variation in immigrant density across U.S. 
states and heterogeneity in business cycles at the U.S. state level, we provided new evidence 
that remittances to El Salvador and Mexico are in the short run significantly and positively 
affected by the economic conditions where their remitters work, as well as the sectors 
especially important for their employment opportunities. The pattern we obtained is 
consistent with demographic information showing the Salvadorans to be more spread across 
the U.S. compared to the Mexicans who cluster in California and the other Southwestern 
border states. Remittances to El Salvador seem related to so many—and diverse— U.S. states 
that a relationship to remittances also shows up in the results using aggregate U.S. data, so 
one could as well argue these flows are in fact responding to a broader U.S. cycle. 
Remittances to Mexico on the other hand show some quite dramatic and interesting 
differences between the aggregate and state level: while strongly related to employment in a 
limited number of states, we find no significant relationships to total U.S. employment. 
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To assess the picture facing the “average” Mexican or Salvadoran immigrant, we constructed 
aggregate variables weighted by the share of Hispanic population in each state. Again, we 
obtained strongly significant results in contrast to the aggregate variables un-weighted by 
Hispanic population. We also found the four border states to be of special importance for 
remittances to Mexico, which is not surprising given that around 60% of its immigrants 
reside there. We also found macroeconomic conditions in remitter’ home countries to matter, 
suggesting that remittances could increase both in response to a negative shock at home or a 
positive one abroad.  
 
Future research using remittance data surrounded by less uncertainty will be able to estimate 
the links between remittances and local or regional host country economic activity more 
precisely. A major step forward would be to better match origins and destinations of 
remittances by using data disaggregated by U.S. source states, possibly from market 
intermediaries. 
 
Our analysis has important policy implications. Once we know more about which host 
country conditions matter for remittances, we are much better equipped to e.g. forecast 
remittance flows. Given the considerable social and macroeconomic importance of 
remittances in many recipient economies, this is highly desirable and timely task.  
 
We however think our most important policy contribution is to suggest new links for how 
remittances affect the macroeconomic performance of the recipient economies. This paper, 
although purely empirical, has suggested that remittances might not only smooth home 
country shocks due to their possibly countercyclical features but also transmit shocks 
originating in the host countries. As shown in our theoretical companion paper, Magnusson 
(2008), this mechanism is quantitatively important for the volatility of e.g. consumption in 
the recipient economies. For recipient countries whose aggregate economic cycles are highly 
correlated with those of the countries where their remitters work, this also means remittances 
will fall simultaneously with negative shocks to domestic output. Future research, as well as 
the current worsening economic situation facing the U.S. and the remittances-receiving 
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VII.   APPENDIX 
Table 4 Fraction of Hispanic population in the U.S., per state  
  1995  2000  2005  1995  2000  2005 
Alabama  0,11%  0,21%  0,23%  Montana  0,05%  0,05% 
Alaska   0,08%  0,07%  0,08%  Nebraska  0,16%  0,27% 
Arizona  3,44%  3,69%  3,70%  Nevada  0,68%  1,12% 
Arkansas  0,08%  0,24%  0,29%  New Hampshire  0,05%  0,06% 
California  33,76%  31,08%  34,88%  New Jersey  3,20%  3,16% 
Colorado  2,04%  2,09%  2,02%  New Mexico  2,71%  2,16% 
Connecticut  0,89%  0,90%  0,84%  New York  9,41%  8,09% 
Delaware  0,07%  0,11%  0,11%  North Carolina  0,36%  1,07% 
DC  0,13%  0,13%  0,11%  North Dakota  0,02%  0,02% 
Florida  7,32%  7,61%  7,65%  Ohio  0,60%  0,61% 
Georgia  0,51%  1,23%  1,51%  Oklahoma  0,37%  0,51% 
Hawai  0,36%  0,25%  0,22%  Oregon  0,53%  0,77% 
Idaho  0,26%  0,29%  0,29%  Pennsylvania  1,01%  1,11% 
Illinois  3,92%  4,32%  4,02%  Rhode Island  0,19%  0,26% 
Indiana  0,43%  0,60%  0,62%  South Carolina  0,14%  0,27% 
Iowa  0,14%  0,23%  0,24%  South Dakota  0,02%  0,03% 
Kansas  0,41%  0,53%  0,10%  Tennessee  0,15%  0,35% 
Kentucky  0,10%  0,17%  0,18%  Texas  19,96%  18,91% 
Louisiana  0,40%  0,30%  0,28%  Utah  0,41%  0,57% 
Maine  0,03%  0,03%  0,03%  Vermont  0,02%  0,02% 
Maryland  0,54%  0,64%  0,70%  Virginia  0,72%  0,94% 
Massachusetts  1,22%  1,22%  0,41%  Washington  1,00%  1,25% 
Michigan  0,88%  0,93%  0,85%  West Virginia  0,04%  0,04% 
Minnesota  0,23%  0,40%  0,41%  Wisconsin  0,41%  0,55% 
Mississippi  0,07%  0,11%  0,11%  Wyoming  0,11%  0,09% 
Missouri  0,27%  0,33%  0,35%          
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
Table 5 Salvadorans and Mexicans in the U.S. 
Unit: Hundreds of thousands                
   1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
El 
Salvador  656  701  607  723  761  765  829  868  1,019  955  1,121  1,091 
Mexico  6,668  6,679  7,017  7,119  7,197  7,841  8,259  9,659  9,967  10,453  10,805  10,900 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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Table 6 Percentage of matricula consular identity cards issued in different U.S. states 
 
 Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico 
 
Table 7 Correlations between cyclical components of HP-filter, remittances and U.S. state-level variables 
   Mexico     El Salvador    
   Coeff.  T-stat  Coeff.  T-stat 
AZ Output  0.35  (2.67)  0.75  (7.94) 
AZ Construction  0.68  (6.54)  0.72  (7.38) 
AZ Services  0.31  (2.33)  0.70  (6.89) 
CA Output      0.64  (5.89) 
CA Construction  0.60  (5.24)  0.71  (7.13) 
CA Services      0.63  (5.72) 
CO Output      0.52  (4.28) 
CO Construction      0.61  (5.40) 
FL Output  0.42  (3.26)  0.83  (10.48) 
FL Construction  0.78  (8.73)  0.70  (7.02) 
FL Services  0.35  (2.62)  0.56  (4.77) 
   2004  2005  2006  2007 
California  37,34%  38,60%  40,23%  42,52% 
Texas  15,61%  15,58%  16,20%  15,78% 
Illinois  12,68%  11,46%  9,76%  8,79% 
Georgia  4,25%  3,91%  3,84%  3,28% 
Arizona  3,74%  4,06%  4,07%  4,72% 
Florida  3,32%  2,46%  2,74%  2,91% 
North Carolina  2,45%  2,67%  2,55%  2,11% 
Indiana  2,40%  2,10%  1,98%  1,45% 
Oregon  2,40%  2,33%  2,10%  1,74% 
New York  2,37%  2,28%  2,01%  3,33% 
Colorado  2,19%  2,25%  2,13%  2,30% 
Nevada  2,18%  2,93%  2,85%  2,33% 
Washington  1,96%  1,79%  1,75%  1,07% 
Pennsylvania  1,16%  0,74%  0,86%  0,53% 
Utah  1,09%  1,64%  1,53%  1,45% 
Nebraska  1,03%  0,83%  0,89%  0,73% 
New Mexico  1,00%  1,00%  1,00%  1,00% 
Missouri  0,89%  0,94%  0,84%  0,78% 
DC  0,81%  1,06%  0,99%  1,17% 
Michigan  0,77%  0,72%  0,57%  0,42% 
Massachusetts  0,11%  0,11%  0,11%  0,11% 
Arkansas  0,00%  0,00%  0,00%  0,71% 
Minnesota  0,00%  0,56%  0,89%  0,90%   23 
GA Output      0.62  (5.58) 
GA Construction      0.55  (4.66) 
GA Services      0.55  (4.71) 
NV Output  0.53  (4.44)  0.74  (7.74) 
NV Construction  0.78  (8.83)  0.58  (4.97) 
NV Services      0.51  (4.21) 
NJ Output      0.56  (4.82) 
NJ Construction      0.45  (3.55) 
NM Output  0.34  (2.58)  0.69  (6.72) 
NM Construction  0.52  (4.33)  0.78  (8.84) 
NY Output      0.62  (5.87) 
TX Output      0.65  (6.27) 
VA Output      0.72  (7.33) 
VA Construction  0.60  (5.36)  0.79  (9.11) 
VA Services        0.69  (6.78) 
Source: Author’s calculations. Note: All of the above correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 8 Correlations between cyclical components of HP-filtered data, remittances, host and home 
country aggregate variables 
   Mexico     El Salvador 
   Coeff.  T-stat  Coeff.  T-stat 
U.S. employment, total  -0.09  -0.5  0.64***  7.04 
U.S. employment, construction  0.35***  2.55  0.56***  4.61 
U.S. employment, services  -0.05  -0.33  0.47***  3.59 
MX GDP  -0.21*  -1.41     
SLV GDP        -0.21*  -1.35 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Note: *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level respectively.  
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Table 9 Distributed Lag Estimation, Mexican remittances and state-level U.S. variables  
Mexico                 
  With U.S. average, origin GDP and exchange rate control      
  
Sum of coefficients 
on US variables 
T-
stat  R squared    
Sum of coefficients 
on US variables 
T-
stat  R squared 
Arizona 
construction  3.43**  2.21  0.46 
Florida 
services  8.07***  2.43  0.51 
Arizona 
employment  7.94**  1.92  0.44 
New 
Mexico 
construction  4.39***  2.68  0.59 
Arizona 
services  2.86*  1.36  0.52 
New 
Mexico 
employment  4.38**  1.76  0.82 
California 
construction  2.13**  1.70  0.88 
Nevada 
construction  1.18**  1.40  0.39 
California 
employment  5.08**  2.60  0.81 
Nevada 
employment  8.12***  2.79  0.52 
Colorado 
construction  5.90**  1.83  0.49 
Nevada 
services  10.86***  3.43  0.62 
Colorado 
services  10.54*  1.40  0.54 
New York 
construction  10.25**  1.97  0.70 
Florida 
construction  2.88**  2.40  0.51 
New York 
employment  3.03*  1.38  0.37 
Florida 
employment  4.74***  1.72  0.79 
Texas 
construction  7.11**  1.92  0.78 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level respectively. 
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Table 10 Distributed Lag Estimation, Salvadoran remittances and state-level U.S. variables 
El Salvador                 




US variables  T-stat 
R 
squared    
Sum of coefficients 






construction  0.62**  2.13  0.22   
New Mexico 
employment  8.67**  1.81  0.22 
Arizona 
employment  2.20**  2.11  0.29   
Nevada 
construction  0.59*  1.51  0.27 
Arizona 
service  4.44**  3.14  0.46   
Nevada 
employment  2.72**  1.89  0.28 
California 
construction  1.01*  1.32  0.17   
Nevada 
services  1.51**  1.71  0.25 
California 
employment  3.53*  1.35  0.19   
New York 
employment  1.74*  1.39  0.18 
California 
services  3.27*  1.31  0.21   
New York 
Services  7.61**  2.36  0.23 
Colorado 
employment  2.54*  1.39  0.23   
New Jersey 
employment  4.78**  1.77  0.19 
Florida 
construction  2.12**  1.96  0.17   
New Jersey 
services  5.51*  1.41  0.13 
Florida 
employment  3.16**  1.73  0.22    Texas output  3.07**  2.18  0.32 
Florida 
services  4.22*  1.42  0.11   
Virginia 
construction  1.917*  1.55  0.16 
Georgia 
employment  3.55**  1.88  0.19   
Virginia 
employment  4.22*  1.32  0.18 
Georgia 
services  4.78**  1.96  0.23   
Virginia 
services  5.31**  1.74  0.11 
New Mexico 
construction  1.21*  1.51  0.24               
   
 
Source: Author’s calculations. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level respectively.  